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Punitive Damages and the Constitution
Thomas H. Dupree, Jr.*
Few areas of the law are as plagued by problems of uncertainty
and unfairness as punitive damages. They are all too often awarded
in amounts that bear little relation to the alleged injury, and for
conduct that was not clearly unlawful-let alone so extreme and
outrageous as to warrant an additional sanction on top of a
compensatory damages award. In many cases, punitive damages
amount to a lottery ticket that can lead to a multimillion dollar
windfall for a fortunate plaintiff.
Punitive, or exemplary, damages have existed for centuries, yet
it was only in the later years of the twentieth century that the
dangers of punitive damages captured the nation's attention, as
juries began awarding staggering sums, often against large
multinational corporations.1 By 1996, the United States Supreme
Court had seen enough. In its landmark ruling in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore (Gore), the Court held that the Constitution
prohibits "grossly excessive" punitive damages awards.2 The Court
set forth three guideposts to steer the excessiveness inquiry,
directing the lower courts to focus on the reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, the ratio between the compensatory and
punitive damages awards, and the amount of statutory penalties
that could be imposed for comparable conduct.
3
In the years since Gore was decided, the lower courts have
repeatedly applied and interpreted these guideposts, some
faithfully, others less so. The Supreme Court itself has revisited the
issue several times, clarifying and strengthening the constitutional
limits on punitive damages.
4
The Gore guideposts assist courts in determining when the
amount of a punitive damage award renders the award
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1. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Recent years... have witnessed an explosion in the
frequency and size of punitive damages awards. . . . The amounts can be
staggering.... Medians as well as averages are skyrocketing, meaning that even
routine awards are growing in size.").
2. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
3. Id. at 574-75.
4. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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unconstitutional. But there is an antecedent question: what limits
does the Constitution place on when punitive damages may be
imposed? That is to say, the Constitution limits the amount of
awards, but does it also limit the circumstances under which a
defendant may even be held liable for punitive damages in the first
place?
The answer is yes. It is a bedrock principle of constitutional
law that individuals are entitled to fair notice of the conduct that
may subject them to punishment. If the law is so unclear or
indeterminate that a reasonable person cannot discern the line
separating the lawful from the unlawful, then he may not, as a
matter of due process, be punished for crossing that line.
But whereas this general constitutional principle is firmly
established, the Supreme Court has yet to clarify how courts
should apply it in practice when reviewing punitive damages
awards in particular cases. This Article identifies two closely
analogous lines of case law that can inform and guide this inquiry.
The first is the "void for vagueness" doctrine, which holds that a
law that does not identify the lrohibited conduct with sufficient
precision may not be enforced. The second is the common law
rule, recognized most recently in Safeco Insurance Co. of America
v. Burr (Burr), that recklessness must be determined by reference
to objective standards that are known in advance.6
Part I of this Article traces the history of the constitutional
limitations on punitive damages, paying particular attention to the
concept of "fair notice" that underlies the Supreme Court's
decisions in this area. Part II then argues that the Court's vagueness
jurisprudence, along with the common law approach to recklessness,
provide concrete standards that courts can use in considering a
defendant's claim that no amount of punitive damages is
constitutionally permissible in light of the conduct at issue.
I. THE DEVELOPING LAW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The Early Cases
Even before Gore, the Supreme Court had recognized that the
Constitution limits punitive damages awards and the procedures
through which they may be imposed. The Court noted the issue in
a 1986 case, Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, in which it stated
that federal constitutional challenges to punitive damages awards
raise "important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be
5. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
6. 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
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resolved."7 Two years later, Justice O'Connor, in a concurring
opinion, wrote that "[i]n my view, because of the punitive
character of such awards, there is reason to think that [unlimited
jury discretion] may violate the Due Process Clause." 8
The Court revisited the issue the following term in Browning-
Ferris Industries, Inc. of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, holding that
while the Excessive Fines Clause did not constrain a punitive
damages award-because the government neither prosecuted the
action nor could claim a share of the award, the Court would
reserve for "another day" the "precise question . . . whether due
process acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive
damages in the absence of any express statutory limit."
9
In 1991, the Court finally made explicit what it had been
hinting: that the Due Process Clause limits the amount of a
punitive damages award. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip (Haslip), the Court concluded that "unlimited jury
discretion--or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in the
fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar
one's constitutional sensibilities."' 0 Although the Court declined to
"draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally
acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit
every case," it held that "general concerns of reasonableness and
adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to a jury
properly enter into the constitutional calculus."" The Court
reinforced this point two years later in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., where it again emphasized that "general
concerns of reasonableness" govern the determination of whether a
punitive damages award is "so 'grossly excessive' as to violate the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause."'
12
The Court's final pre-Gore punitive damages case was Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg (Oberg).13 In that case, the Court emphasized
that punitive damages "pose an acute danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property" and noted that "the rise of large, interstate
and multinational corporations has aggravated the problem of
arbitrary awards and potentially biased juries."' 14
7. 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986).
8. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
9. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257,
264, 276-77 (1989).
10. 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
11. Id.
12. 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993).
13. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
14. Id. at 431-32.
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B. The Due Process Guideposts
The Court made these limits concrete in Gore, where it set
forth the three guideposts-reprehensibility, ratio, and comparable
penalties-that govern constitutional review of the excessiveness
of punitive damages awards. At heart, Gore is a case about "fair
notice." The guideposts are intended to assist in determining
whether the defendant can be deemed to have had fair notice of the
punishment that could be imposed for particular conduct. As the
Court explained, "[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our
constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice
not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment but
also of the severity of the penalty that a state may impose."'15
A constitutional excessiveness analysis must be performed
"with care[] to ensure both reasonableness and proportionality."' 16
When reviewing an award on appeal, a court must apply an
"[e]xacting" standard, and conduct its own "thorough, independent
review" of the trial court's determination of the award's
constitutionality. 17 Rigorous appellate review under a de novo
standard, the Court has emphasized, ensures that the Gore
standards "will acquire more meaningful content through case-by-
case application" and "helps to assure the uniform treatment of
similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself.' 18
The Court has identified a variety of factors that may bear upon
a defendant's level of reprehensibility. These include the presence
of physical harm, the financial vulnerability of the plaintiff, and
repeated or malicious conduct by the defendant. 19 Nonetheless,
"[t]he existence of any one of these factors weighing in favor of a
plaintiff may not be sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award-
and the absence of all of them renders any award suspect.26
Moreover, in many cases, no award of punitive damages may be
justified. That is because "[i]t should be presumed a plaintiff has
been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages, so
punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant's
culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so
reprehensible as to warrant the impFosition of further sanctions to
achieve punishment or deterrence."' 1
15. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).
16. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003).
17. Id. at 418; Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 441
(2001).
18. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436 (citation omitted).
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Although the Court has eschewed imposing a bright-line
permissible ratio between compensatory and punitive damages, it
has repeatedly noted-in Haslip, Gore, and State Farm v.
Campbell-that legislative sanctions typically provide for double,
treble, or quadruple damages. 22 Moreover, it has emphasized that
where "compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio,
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the
outermost limit of the due process guarantee." Notably, in Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker-a case that involved not a constitutional
excessiveness challenge but rather an excessiveness challenge
under federal maritime common law-the Court reduced a punitive
damages award to a 1: 1 ratio.
24
The third guidepost requires courts to compare the punitive
damages award with legislatively authorized civil sanctions, as
well as with punitive damages awards imposed in comparable
cases. The Court has underscored the limited relevance of criminal
sanctions, explaining that "[p]unitive damages are not a substitute
for the criminal process, and the remote possibility of a criminal
sanction does not automatically sustain a punitive damages
award."2
5
The Court has also held that punitive damages may not be
imposed on the basis of harm to nonparties or on a defendant's
26
extraterritorial conduct or business activities. Permitting
punishment to vindicate harms to persons not before the court
would deny the defendant an opportunity to raise defenses
particular to the absent persons; for example, in a product liability
case, the defendant might be able to show that the absent person
assumed the risk or ignored a manufacturer's warning. 27 Although
harm to others may factor into the reprehensibility calculus, "a jury
may not go further than this and use a punitive damages verdict to
punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to
have visited on nonparties., 28 Likewise, punitive damages
generally may not be based on a defendant's conduct in other
states. That is because "[a] basic principle of federalism is that
each State may make its own reasoned judgment about what
conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each
State alone can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to
22. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581 & n.33 (1996); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
23. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
24. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
25. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 428.
26. Id. at 421-22.
27. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353-54 (2007).
28. Id. at 355.
425
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impose on a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.' 29 Thus, a
jury "may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a
defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it
occurred," nor "does a State have a legitimate concern in imposing
punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts
committed outside the State's jurisdiction. 30
II. FAIR NOTICE AND THE THRESHOLD QUESTION OF LIABILITY
The fair notice principle articulated in Gore mandates that
defendants be given notice of the conduct that may subject them to
punishment, as well as the amount of the penalty that may be
imposed. But the Court has given little concrete guidance as to
how this principle should be applied in the first situation-that is,
where a defendant claims it lacked fair notice that its conduct
could subject it to punishment.
The Court need not write on a blank slate, however, as two
lines of case law inform this analysis. The first is the Court's "void
for vagueness" jurisprudence, which generally holds that a person
cannot be punished for violating a statute that is so indeterminate
that it is not clear what conduct it prohibits. 31 The second is the
common law rule, recently reaffirmed in Burr, that a person may
not be punished for engaging in conduct that was objectively
reasonable. 32 As the Supreme Court recognized in Oberg, common
law requirements provide a "touchstone" for constitutional
analysis, and where a state elects to jettison a longstanding
common law protection against punitive damages, there is a, 33
presumption that the state's scheme is unconstitutional.
These two lines of case law are properly read to require, as a
matter of federal due process, that a defendant's conduct be
assessed by reference to some objective measure or standard
before punitive damages may be imposed. In a particular case, an
objective measure might consist of a relevant statute or regulation,
or the common practices of others in an industry or community. If,
however, the basis for a punitive damages claim is merely the
belief of the plaintiff-or his expert witness-that the defendant
acted outrageously, it cannot be said that the defendant had fair
notice that the challenged conduct could subject him to
punishment. Whether viewed as an issue of vagueness (in the sense
29. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422.
30. Id. at 421-22.
31. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
32. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
33. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994).
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that the applicable punitive damages statute could not have given
notice that the conduct was prohibited) or through the lens of the
common law (in the sense that the defendant's conduct could not
be deemed objectively unreasonable), the Constitution prohibits
the imposition of punishment under such circumstances.
A. Vagueness
The Constitution guarantees "fair notice .. . of the conduct that
will subject [one] to punishment." 34 As the Supreme Court said in
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States-where it reversed the
accounting firm's conviction--"a fair warning should be given to
the world in language that the common world will understand[] of
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed."35 This
principle has been given concrete application in the Court's
vagueness case law, in which the Court has considered due process
challenges to noise and vagrancy ordinances, among other things,
based on the argument that the statute fails to identify with any
precision what conduct it prohibits.
In Grayned v. City of Rockford, the Court stated that "[i]t is a
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for
vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined., 36 There are
two vices in vague laws. The first is that vafue laws "may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning." 3 The Court explained
that "because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly." 38 The second vice is
that laws that fail to "provide explicit standards for those who
apply them" create the risk of "arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."3 9 That is because "[a] vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to policemen,,judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.
With regard to the first problem with vague laws-that they
fail to provide fair warning-the Court has long deemed it "a well
recognized requirement" that "the terms of a penal statute creating
34. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417 (quoting BMW of N. Am, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 574 (1996)).
35. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703 (2005)
(quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).




40. Id. at 108-09.
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a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are
subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties. '41 Such a requirement is:
[C]onsonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the
settled rules of law; and a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application violates the first essential of
due process of law.
4
In Connally v. General Construction Co., the Court held that a
state statute compelling businesses to pay workers "not less than
the current rate of per diem wages in the locality" was
unconstitutionally vague.43 Businesses that had every intention of
complying with the law were unable to determine what the law
required, and hence unable to steer a lawful course. There could be
no assurance that a company's assessment of what territory was
encompassed within a "locality" would square with a jury or
court's hindsight determination, and a company faced the threat of
severe sanctions if it guessed wrong. The Court concluded that the
consequence of the statute's indeterminacy was that:
[T]he application of the law depends, not upon a word of
fixed meaning in itself, or one made definite by statutory or
judicial definition, or by the context or other legitimate aid
to its construction, but upon the probably varying
impressions of juries as to whether given areas are or are
not to be included within particular localities.44
Regarding the second problem with vague laws-that they
create a risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement-the
Court in Kolender v. Lawson emphasized "the requirement that a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement. 4 5 In that case, the Court held that a statute requiring
loiterers to provide a "credible and reliable" form of identification
to police officers upon request was unconstitutionally vague.46 The
Court condemned the law as "failing to describe with sufficient
particularity what a suspect might do in order to satisfy the
statute," thus permitting "a standardless sweep [that] allows
41. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 388.
44. Id. at 395.
45. 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
574 (1974)).
46. Id. at 353-54.
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policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal
predilections.
'A 7
These rules are readily applicable to the law of punitive
damages. In fact, the Court has repeatedly warned that punitive
damages awards are particularly susceptible to vagueness
problems; it has condemned "[v]ague instructions, or those that
merely inform the jury to avoid 'passion or prejudice,"' on the
ground that such instructions "do little to aid the decisiomnaker in
its task of assigning appropriate weight to evidence that is relevant
and evidence that is tangential or only inflammatory. ' '48 In one of
the Court's early punitive damages decisions, Justice O'Connor
dissented, warning that:
[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to
classify arbitrariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due
process-of the law in general-is to allow citizens to
order their behavior. A State can have no legitimate interest
in deliberately making the law so arbitrary that citizens will
be unable to avoid punishment solely upon bias or whim.49
A majority of the Court later adopted this reasoning in full.50
The concerns underlying the Court's vagueness jurisprudence
apply with full force to punitive damages awards. In many cases,
there is no way that the defendant could have known in advance
that it could be subjected to punitive damages for the conduct at
issue. For example, a Tennessee jury awarded a plaintiff $98
million in punitive damages in a product liability case based on an
allegation that the seatbacks in Chrysler's Dodge Caravan were
defectively designed because they were too weak.51 Chrysler
pointed to undisputed evidence that its design more than doubled
federal seatback strength standards and that Chrysler's seats were
"mainstream" within the industry.52 And even though Tennessee
law "restrict[s] the awarding of punitive damages to cases
involving the most egregious of wrongs," 53 the jury imposed a
massive punitive damages award, and the Tennessee Supreme
Court agreed that punitive damages were appropriate. 54 Under
these circumstances, there is no way that Chrysler, or any
47. Id. at 358, 361 (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575).
48. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).
49. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
50. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417-18.
51. See Flax v. DaimlerChrysler, 272 S.W.3d 521 (Tenn. 2008).
52. Id. at 557 (Koch, J., dissenting).
53. Hodges v. S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992).
54. See Flax, 272 S.W.3d at 536-37.
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manufacturer, could have known in advance that Tennessee law
would authorize an award of punitive damages.
The Court's concern about vague laws creating a risk of
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement is reflected in the
frequency with which juries impose punitive damages against large
corporations, particularly those from out of state. The dangers of
arbitrariness and bias are heightened when a plaintiff is allowed to
introduce evidence of the defendant's wealth or net worth, on the
theory that only a substantial monetary award will suffice to "get
their attention" and "send a message" to a wealthy corporate
defendant. As the Court has recognized, "U]ury instructions
typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts,
and the presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates
the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases
against big55businesses, particularly those without strong local
presences.
In short, punitive damages laws are precisely the type of vague
laws that are vulnerable to the dangers about which the Supreme
Court has repeatedly warned. This is not to say that most punitive
damages laws are unconstitutional on their face. Rather, courts
must take care to ensure that they are applied in a constitutional
manner; that is, in a way that the defendant can be deemed to have
had fair notice that its conduct could subject it to punishment.
B. Common Law
Another source of authority that casts light on how to
determine when a defendant has the constitutionally-mandated fair
notice is the common law. In determining the scope of
constitutional protections against arbitrary punitive damages
awards, the Court has looked to traditional common law practice.
In Oberg, the Court held that Oregon's "abrogation of a well-
established common-law protection against arbitrary deprivations
of property raises a presumption that its procedures violate the Due
Process Clause.",56 The Court explained that "traditional practice
provides a touchstone for constitutional analysis," and "[w]hen the
absent procedures would have provided protection against arbitrary
and inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not hesitated to find the
proceedings violative of due process." 57 In fact, even Justice
Scalia, who has never accepted the Gore guideposts, agreed that
55. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415, 432 (1994)).
56. Oberg, 512 U.S. at 430.
57. Id.
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"[t]he deprivation of property without observing (or providing a
reasonable substitute for) an important traditional procedure for
enforcing state-prescribed limits upon such deprivation violates the
Due Process Clause."
58
The common law enshrines the principle that when an
individual acts based upon an objectively reasonable interpretation
of the law, he cannot be punished-even if it turns out that his
interpretation was incorrect. In Burr, the Court explained that, at
common law, whether a defendant acted "recklessly"--and thus
could be subjected to punishment-must be determined by
reference to objective standards. 59 "It is this high risk of harm,
objectively assessed, that is the essence of recklessness at common
law.",60 The Court went on to hold that because the defendant's
understanding of its legal obligations, "albeit erroneous, was not
objectively unreasonable," the defendant could not be deemed to
have acted willfully or with reckless disregard.6 1 The Court
explained that "[w]here, as here, the statutory text and relevant
court and agency guidance allow for more than one reasonable
interpretation, it would defy history and current thinking to treat a
defendant who merely adopts one such interpretation as a knowing
or reckless violator." o
The Burr Court looked for guidance to the law of qualified
immunity, which examines "whether an action was reasonable in
light of legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time.
6 3
Thus, a federal officer is entitled to qualified immunity "if officers
of reasonable competence could disagree on the issue." 64 In short,
the qualified immunity test is "simply the adaptation of the fair
warning standard to give officials . . . the same protection from
civil liability and its consequences that individuals have
traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes."
65
The common law approach to recklessness dovetails with the
constitutional limits on vagueness. At common law, an individual
who acts in an objectively reasonable fashion cannot have acted
58. Id. at 436 (Scalia, J., concurring).
59. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007).
60. Id. at 69 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 213 (5th ed. 1984)). This tracks the standard
identified by Holmes in The Common Law-that recklessness must be assessed
by reference to "a general objective standard." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW 136 (Dover Publ'ns, Inc. 1991) (1881).
61. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 at 69.
62. Id. at 70 n.20.
63. Id. at 70 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
64. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
65. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1997).
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
recklessly. But where an individual defies the indicators or metrics
of objectively reasonable conduct, he may well be found to have
acted recklessly. There is rarely a vagueness problem in punishing
a person for objectively unreasonable conduct because the
objective nature of the test ensures that the person had fair notice
that he was engaging in conduct that could subject him to
punishment. However, if the test of unreasonableness is not an
objective one, the defendant cannot be deemed to have had fair
notice, thus triggering both the constitutional and common law
prohibitions on punishment.
C. Objective Reasonableness
The discussion above has demonstrated that if a defendant's
conduct cannot be deemed reckless by reference to readily
ascertainable, objective standards of reasonableness, then punitive
damages may not be imposed as a matter of federal due process.
This subpart identifies and discusses some benchmarks that are
commonly used in establishing the parameters of objectively
reasonable conduct.
One common benchmark of objective reasonableness is the
existence of federal or state statutes governing the conduct at issue.
For example, product liability lawsuits often target a product
whose design is subject to government regulation, such as
airplanes or motor vehicles. If the claim in such a case is that the
manufacturer should not have designed its product in a way that
satisfies the government's design requirements, the manufacturer
should not be subjected to punitive damages for its design.
Looking to government regulations for guidance cannot be deemed
a reckless act, and a manufacturer should not be subjected to
punishment for following the approach prescribed by the
government rather than the ex post approach recommended by the
plaintiff or his expert. Even if a judge or jury concludes that the
manufacturer acted negligently in following the approach approved
by the government, it cannot be said that the manufacturer acted
recklessly and should be subjected to punishment. Such a
conclusion would render the law unconstitutionally vague and
would improperly punish the manufacturer for having acted in an
objectively reasonable fashion. As one of the leading torts treatises
explains, "[i]n most contexts . . . compliance with a statutory
standard should bar liability for punitive damages. ' 66 The common
law thus recognizes that a defendant should not be subjected to
punishment for doing what the government has said it can do.
66. KEETONETAL.,supranote 60, § 36, at233 n.41.
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Another benchmark is the practice of similarly situated people
or companies.67 For example, in a case involving allegedly reckless
behavior by a lawyer or accountant, one very relevant measure of
objective reasonableness would be the approach taken by other
professionals under similar circumstances. Likewise, in a case
where the plaintiff seeks punitive damages based on the actions of
a corporation, the conduct of other companies in that industry that
have been faced with similar circumstances would, in many cases,
be highly relevant to whether the defendant acted in an objectively
unreasonable fashion. A company whose conduct falls within the
mainstream has a strong argument that it did not act recklessly.
A third benchmark is the existence of a genuine, reasonable
debate within the relevant professional or technical community
over the propriety of the challenged course of conduct. If
reasonable people can disagree as to the propriety of a certain
action, that fact alone undercuts any conclusion that taking the
action amounts to objectively unreasonable behavior. The Supreme
Court emphasized this point in Burr, where it held-solely on the
basis of its own reading of the law at issue-that the defendant's
interpretation was objectively reasonable and hence not reckless. 68
In fact, the Court took an identical approach in an early case in
which it held that a $6,300 civil penalty violated due process where
the defendant was "well justified in regarding [its conduct] as
reasonable and in acting on that belief' even assuming that the
defendant "should have known that the Supreme Court of the State
*... might hold the [conduct] unreasonable."69 The Court has also
recognized this principle in the context of qualified immunity,
explaining that "if officers of reasonable competence could
disagree on th[e matter at] issue, immunity should be
recognized., 70 In many punitive damages cases, particularly cases
involving alleged corporate wrongdoing, there will have been an
internal debate over the actions at issue, and the mere fact that
67. Drabik v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 997 F.2d 496, 510 (8th Cir. 1993)
("Compliance with industry standard and custom serves to negate conscious
disregard and to show that the defendant acted with a nonculpable state of
mind."); David G. Owen, Problems In Assessing Punitive Damages Against
Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 40-41 (1982) ("In a
typical case, compliance with a universal industry custom should be held
conclusively to establish good faith against a punitive damages claim. Rarely
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some employees expressed a contrary view does not automatically
entitle a plaintiff to a punitive damages award.
The indicators discussed above are not meant to be an
exclusive list. The nature of the conduct at issue will determine the
relevant benchmarks of objectively reasonable conduct in a
particular case. But the key point is that courts must ensure that the
standard is an objective one, which typically will mean that there
must be evidence other than the subjective belief of the plaintiff
and his expert that the defendant acted recklessly. While awarding
compensatory damages for negligence, or on the basis of strict
liability, may not raise the due process dangers discussed in this
Article, a defendant should not be punished in the absence of fair
notice that its conduct was wrongful. The Constitution requires no
less.
